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that where subsequently discovered facts definitely point to the
defendant's guilt, there can be no valid objection that the confes-
sion is untrustworthy; and the policy of discouraging "third de-
gree" methods must be relied upon for exclusion.
In view of the Legislative policy regarding the admissibility




PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S CROSS-ACTION
BY SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION TO AVOID A DEFAULT
JUDGMENT AS TO THE CROSS-ACTIONO NE of the first cases to be decided by the Texas Supreme
Court in 1.948 was Smock. v. Fischel.1 A defendant in a
main action filed a cross-action against the plaintiff. On the day
of the trial, neither defendant nor his counsel appeared to prose-
cute the cross-action. Plaintiff appeared and was given judgment
on his main action; on the cross-action, the court rendered judg-
ment against the defendant. This judgment was affirmed by the
Court of Civil Appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the Court of Civil Appeals in so far as it had upheld the
judgment for the plaintiff on the main action, but reversed with
respect to the defendants' cross-action.
Four points are then suggested. First, is the question of service
of the defendant's cross-action on the plaintiff; second, the effect of
7TEX. CODE CraM. PiO. (1925) art. 727, governing the admissibility of confessions,
requires that a confession be in writing and include a statutory warning. Art. 727a pro-
vides that evidence obtained by officers in violation of the Constitution or Laws of Texas,
or of the Constitution of the United States, shall not be admitted against the accused.
TE.x. PEN. CoDE (1925) art. 1157, provides for stringent penalties on officers for inflict-
ing physical or mental pain in making or attempting to make a person confess to a crime.
Smock v. Fischel ............. Tex ............ 207 S. W. (2d) 891 (1948).
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an appearance by the plaintiff subsequent to the filing of the
defendant's cross-action; third, the effect on the main action if the
plaintiff does not appear to prosecute the main action; and fourth,
the correct procedure if the defendant does not appear at the time
of the trial.
The first two points are controlled by Harris v. Schlinke which
has been widely followed in Texas.' That case holds that the
plaintiff is bound to take notice of all pleadings, filed by the de-
fendant, in answer to the claims made in his petition; but he is
not required to take notice of an independent claim or cross-action
asserted by the defendant. If such a cross-action is asserted, it is
error for the court to proceed to trial on it unless the plaintiff has
been cited to answer the cross-bill or has appeared in the cause
after it was filed. Plaintiff does not, by filing his suit, invoke the
jurisdiction of the court to litigate the subject matter of a cross-
action against him.
It is well settled that the defendant stands in the position of a
plaintiff in so far as his cross-action is concerned,4 and it follows
that the same means should be used to call upon the defendants
to the cross-action to answer its charges as were required by law
to compel the defendants in the original suit to appear and plead
to that complaint.5
The last two points may also be taken together for they present
the question of the effect if the plaintiff does not appear on the
day of the trial, and the result if defendant having filed a cross-
action fails to appear. According to the Texas rule the Court
should dismiss the original suit for want of prosecution if the
plaintiff fails to appear," but if the defendant has filed a cross-
2Harris v. Schlinke, 95 Tex. 89, 65 S. W. 172 (1901).
sEarly v. Cornelius, 120 Tex. 335, 39 S. W. (2d) 8 (1931) Swift v. Burner, 160
S. W. 990 (Tex. Civ. App. .1913) ; Smith v. Carr, 173 S. W. 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
'Bailey v. Trammell, 27 Tex. 317 (1863) ; Harris v. Schlinke, 95 Tex. 88, 65 S. W.
172 (1901); Barrier v. Lowney, 118 Tex. 227, 11 S. W. (2d) 298 (Tex. Corn. App.
1928) ; 13 S. W. (2d) 688 (Tex. Com. App. 1929).
5Harris v. Schlinke, 95 Tex. 89, 65 S. W. 172 (1901)
OHouston v. Jennings, 12 Tex. 487 (1854) ; Burger Y. Young, 78 Tex. 656, 15 S. W.
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action, he is entitled to have such cross-action tried unaffected by
the plaintiff's dismissal.' Thus, since the defendant stands in the
position of a plaintiff in so far as his cross-action is concerned,
the proper practice for the court to take when defendant fails to
appear is to dismiss the defendant's cross-action for lack of
prosecution.
It is to be noted that the service of the defendant's cross-action
on plaintiff, or plaintiff's appearance in the suit subsequent to the
filing of defendant's cross-action is jurisdictional, in so far as the
cross-action is concerned, and any order rendered against the
plaintiff on the cross-action without these requirements is void.
Although the plaintiff has invoked the jurisdiction of the court on
his main action, he is only placed on notice as to the defenses that
the defendant might file to his allegations, and not to any new
actions asking affimative relief. It is only after the court has ob-
tained jurisdiction over the plaintiff on the cross-action that he
must plead his defenses. If the plaintiff does not appear on the
day of the trial, the proper practice is to dismiss the main action
without prejudice to any cross-claim in the suit. These cross-
claims may proceed to final judgment if the court has jurisdiction
over the respective parties by their having been served with process
as to the cross-action or having appeared subsequent to the filing
of the cross-action. The same rule of failure to prosecute by the
plaintiff applies to the defendant. If defendant fails to prosecute
his cross-action, it does not prejudice the plaintiff's main action
and the proper procedure of the Court is to dismiss the defendant's
cross-action.
Thus far, only those situations where the defendant files a cross-
action against the plaintiff have been considered. The questions
are presented as to the necessary procedure where defendant files
a cross-action against a co-defendant, or where a plaintiff amends
107 (1890); Browning v. Pumphrey, 81 Tex. 166, 16 S. W. 870 (1891); Harris v.
Schlinke, 95 Tex. 88, 65 S. W. 172 (1901) ; Roosth v. Poth, 198 S. W. (2d) 132 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1946).
TTEx. RuLmS CKv. PRo. (1948) Rule 96.
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his original complaint against a defendant, setting up a new cause
of action.
Sullivan v. Doyle' holds that in a cross-action by one defendant
against a co-defendant, there is no necessity of citation of the
cross-action on the co-defendant if the co-defendant has made his
appearance in the main action. Note that the rule is different in
the case of a cross-action against the plaintiff, for he must be
served or have made an appearance subsequent to the filing of the
cross-action, but if the co-defendant has appeared in the main
action, even if before the filing of the cross-action he is put on
notice for all purposes.'
Attention should also be given to Phillips v. The Maccabees"°
which raises the question of the necessity of serving the defendant
as to an amended pleading filed by the plaintiff, setting up a new
cause of action against the defendant, where the defendant has
appeared or pleaded to the plaintiff's original petition, but he
does not appear nor plead subsequent to the time that plaintiff
amends his original petition. The court does not answer this
question; however, the court reasons that a defendant who has
been cited, but has not answered must be notified of every
amendment which sets up a new cause of action, but if he has
pleaded to the action or otherwise entered an appearance therein,
then he is on notice of all amendments thereafter filed." Although
the court says that if defendant has appeared, he is on notice of all
subsequent amendments, it is not clear whether the court will con-
sider the term "all amendments" to include also amendments
setting up an entirely new cause of action. As the facts stood in the
Maccabees case, the defendant was actually in the court room
when the plaintiff asked the permission of the court to amend his
8Sullivan v. Doyle, 118 Tex. 368, 194 S. W. 136 (1917); Empire Gas and Fuel Co.
v. Noble, 121 Tex. 138, 36 S. W. (2d) 451 (Tex. Com. App. 1931).
9 Ibid; Minus v. Doyle, 141 Tex. 67, 170 S. W. (2d) 223 (1943) ; Mitchell v. Gooch,
210 S. W. (2d) 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
loPhillips v. The Maccabees, 50 S. W. (2d) 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
"Id. at 479; H and T. C. Ry. Co. v. Walker, 107 Tex. 241, 173 S. W. 208 (1915);
Spivey v. Saner-Ragley Lumber Co., 284 S. W. 210 (Tex. Com. App. 1926).
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petition. Defendant thereby had actual notice and did not need
additional notice to inform him of the action that he would be ex-
pected to defend. Thus the question proposed is distinguished
from the Maccabees case in that the defendant had only appeared
in the original suit and knew nothing about the amended petition
with the new cause of action. If the proposed hypothetical question
is ever decided, the decision will probably turn upon whether the
court strictly construes the general rule that after defendant has
pleaded or appeared in the main action, he is before the court
for all purposes and is charged with notice of all amendments
thereafter. In this connection, it is interesting to note that in
Harris v. Schlinke2 the court based its conclusion that citation is
necessary in a cross-action by defendant against plaintiff on the
premise that citation is necessary when plaintiff by amendment
sets up a new cause of action against defendant. This case cites
with approval an early Texas case' 3 which holds that if process as
to the original petition is served on the defendant, and later the
plaintiff files an amended petition setting up a new cause of action,
and this amended petition is not served on defendant, then a judg-
ment by default cannot be taken against the defendant. The case
further said that there must be service as to the amendment or the
record must disclose the fact that the party to be affected by the
amendment, was actually in court, in person, or by attorney, and
might have had notice of such amendment.
NEW TRIAL
Reynolds v. Dallas County1" decided that Rule 515 prevents the
Court of Civil Appeals, after the initial time has expired, to ex-
tend or enlarge the period allowed for filing a motion for rehear-
ing even when good cause for delay is shown. This holding is
important for its effect upon late motions for new trials as a basis
12 Harris v. Schlinke, 95 Tex. 89, 65 S. W. 172 (1901).
'aMorrison v. Walker, 22 Tex. 19 (1858).
4 Reynolds v. Dallas County, .. Tex. 207 S. W. (2d) 362 (1948).
15Tgx. RuLEs Cr. PRo. (1948) Rule 5.
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for appeal, and also on late motions for new trials as such. Rule 516
provides that where an act is required or allowed to be done by the
rules of civil procedure, in a specified time, the court may allow
the time enlarged if application is made therefor before the
period prescribed expires, or on motion may permit the act to be
done after the expiration of the specified period. But, it is to be
noticed that the rule further provides that it may not enlarge the
period for taking any action under the rules relating to new trials
or motions for rehearing except as stated in the individual rules
specifying a time limit. Note also that as this is a part of subdivi-
sion (b) of the rule, which subdivision refers to the power to
enlarge the time after the initial time has expired, a correct con-
struction would seem to be that this restriction does not apply to
an extension of time granted before the initial period has expired.
On examination of the rules relating to new trials, it is noticed
that none contain exceptions or means of extending the time
allowed.1" The Reynolds"5 case by analogy supports the proposi-
tion that the period for filing a motion for a new trial cannot be
extended by an order entered after the initial period has expired.
However, it is to be noticed that the language of this case tends to
deal in effect with a motion for a new trial as a basis of appeal.
Thus, it is not clear as to whether the courts would allow a late
motion for a new trial, as such, and not as a basis of appeal, on a
showing of good cause for delay. One case decided in 1934 before
Rule 5 was passed held:"
"Subdivision 29 requires that the original motion for new trial be filed
within 10 days after the judgment is rendered, and it contains nothing
suggesting that the court may permit its filing at a later date. However,
since jurisdiction over the case continues, in the absence of a motion,
for 30 days from the date of the judgment, the court may in its discre-
1lbid.
1TmL RULES CMy. PRO. (1948) Rule 320, 330 (j), (k).
18Reynolds v. Dallas County, Tex -.......... ,207 S. W. (2d) 562 (1948).
19Dallas Storage v. Taylor. 124 Tex. 315, 77 S. W. (2d) 1031 (Tex. Cor. App.
1934).
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tion, within such 30 day period, entertain a motion filed after the 10
days but within the 30 days...-20
Whether a late motion for a new trial, not to be used as a basis for
an appeal, will be allowed is at present an open question in Texas,
but there is an indication in the Reynolds case of how the courts
might decide it, for Justice Sharp makes the statement that, "[t]he
language used in Rule 5 and in Rule 458 is also plain and spe-
cific."'" And if the strict language of Rule 5 is applied, then no
late filings of motions for new trials, either as a basis of appeal or
not, will be allowed.
EVIDENCE-PREPONDERANCE AND No EVIDENCE
What is the difference between no evidence and preponderance
of evidence? A 1948 Texas case Najera v. Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Co.22 involves this question and states:
"This finding by the Court of Civil Appeals of no evidence includes the
lesser finding that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict;
and the insufficiency of the evidence having thus been presented by
proper assignments in the Court of Civil Appeals, this case must be
remanded to the district court for a new trial.'23
Thus it is seen that in this case, there is presented not only the
question of the difference between no evidence and preponderance;
but also, the rulings of the appellate courts as to the disposition of
the case when there is a question of no evidence or preponderance
of the evidence.
The rule of no evidence has been defined as follows:
"The rule of no evidence is that if looking only to this one side, reason-
able minds simply could not differ-there is just no question but that
201d. at 1033.
2t Reynolds v. Dallas County ............. Tex ................ 207 S. W. (2d) 362, 364
(1948).




this evidence has failed to prove the fact-then the no evidence rule
applies. ' '2 4
In such a case, since reasonable minds could not differ on the
fact, then there is no jury question. But the rule of preponderance
of evidence is:
".... completely blinding yourself to one side of the evidence and look-
ing at the testimony on one side, if reasonable minds could at least
differ on whether that evidence establishes the fact, then there is a jury
issue." 25
It is to be noticed that whether there is sufficient evidence upon an
issue to warrant its submission to the jury is a question for the
trial judge. 6 The leading case in Texas on this subject is Joske
v. Irvine.27
The Supreme Court being a court of law and not of fact, can-
not determine for itself any questions of fact requisite to enable
it to render judgment.2" The Court of Civil Appeals, however, has
jurisdiction to review the trial court's determination of the facts of
a case, and it also has power to set aside the findings of the jury
and remand the case for another trial.2" The powers of the Court
of Civil Appeals in this connection are succinctly stated in an
opinion of the Supreme Court as follows:
"If there is no evidence to sustain a judgment upon an issue material
to a recovery, the Appellate Court may, in its discretion render judg-
ment for the appellant or remand the cause for a new trial .... But if
the evidence be conflicting, and the judgment be reversed because the
24Bar Institutes at Lubbock Tex. 1948, p. 80.211d. at 79.
2SGalveston, H. and S. A. Ry. Co. v. Murray, 99 S. W. 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907);
Scott v. Industrial Finance Corp., 265 S. W. 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) ; Ft. Worth &
R. G. Ry. Co. v. McMurray, 173 S. W. 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914). McCoRMICK AND
RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EvwENcE, 7 § 4 (1937).
2?Joske v. Irvine, 91 Tex. 574, 44 S. W. 1059 (1898).
28Lee v. International T. S. N. Ry. Co., 89 Tex. 583, 36 S. W. 63 (1896) ; Dickson
v. Kilgore State Bank, 157 S. W. 867 (Tex. Corn. App. 1924), 3 TEx. JUR. § 837
(1929).
29Tweed v. West. Union Tel. Co., 107 Tex. 247; 166 S. W. 696 (1914) ; Pollock ,.
Houston & T. C. R. R. Co.. 103 Tex. 69. 123 S. W. 408 (1909).
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verdict of the jury or the findings of the trial court are against the
great preponderance of the evidence, we think the only proper course
is to remand the cause."3 0
The Court of Civil Appeals in the Najera case found that there
was no evidence to support the judgment and rendered a verdict.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Civil Appeals and
held that the Court of Civil Appeals actually made two findings,
one that there was no evidence; and two, that there was an insuf-
ficiency of evidence to support the verdict. The Supreme Court also
ruled that the Court of Civil Appeals was incorrect in finding that
there was no evidence because there was evidence sufficient to be
decided by a jury. Therefore, when the Supreme Court disagreed
with the Court of Civil Appeals finding of no evidence, it left
only the second finding of the insufficiency, or the preponderance
of the evidence, which the Supreme Court declared was contained
in the Court of Civil Appeals finding of no evidence. And, where
the question is a finding concerning preponderance or the insuf-
ficiency of the evidence, the correct procedure is not to render a
verdict but to remand the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court
could not pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence as this is a ques-
tion of fact, and the Supreme Court decides only questions of law.
In effect, the rule may be stated that if the Court of Civil Appeals
finds that there is no evidence on an issue material to the case, it
can render the case, but if the Supreme Court disagrees with the
Court of Civil Appeals finding of no evidence, then, since the
finding of no evidence includes the finding of insufficient evidence,
the only point left is the sufficiency of the evidence, and the proper
procedure is to remand the case for a new trial, because the
Supreme Court does not have the power to pass upon the sufficiency
of the evidence.
In connection with the rule stated above, it is interesting to con-
sider Watson v. Texas Indemnity Insurance Co.3 This case in-
3OPatrick v. Smith, 40 Tex. 267, 274, 38 S. W. 17, 21 (1896).
3lWatson v. Tex. Indemnity Ins. Co .............. Tex -..--.------ 207 S. W. (2d) 989
(1948).
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volves a workmen's compensation suit that went to the Court of
Civil Appeals, which found that there was no evidence to support
the judgment and reversed the trial court's decision and rendered
judgment for the insurance company. The Supreme Court, in its
decision, never mentions the rule of the Naiera case. Instead, in
the Watson case the Supreme Court decided that the Court of
Civil Appeals was in error in finding that there was no evidence,
and reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. This holding cannot be
reconciled with the Naiera case which held that if the Supreme
Court disagreed with a finding of no evidence by the Court of
Civil Appeals, the proper procedure is to render the case for a
new trial.
Lee S. Bane.
SUBMISSION OF ISSUES-WAIVER AVOIDED BY
OBJECTION THERETO
Harkey v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association1 demon-
strates how, by timely objection to the submission of issues for
lack of support in the pleadings, a party may avoid waiving the
error and, at the same time, avoid pointing up the specific variance
between the opponent's proof and his pleadings.
In a workmen's compensation action, the plaintiff alleged, as
good cause in excusing his delay for filing a claim, his reliance
upon "his own belief" as to his recovery from his injuries. His
proof tended to establish a reliance upon a doctor's advice. The
defendant, without having objected to the introduction of testi-
mony, objected to the submission of issues as to reliance upon a
doctor's advice because there was no pleading to support such
issues. These objections were overruled, and the plaintiff had
judgment.
1 146 Tex. 504, 208 S.W.(2d) 919 (1948).
[Vol. 3
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The Supreme Court, affirming the judgment of the Court of
Civil Appeals,' reversing and remanding, held that the objection,
"because there is no pleading authorizing the submission of such
issue,"' (italics supplied) was sufficient enough, in view of the
concise nature of the pleadings and the testimony, to point out
the error to the court.4 Rule 67" was deemed inapplicable; the
defendant having objected to the submission of issues upon a
"tenable ground," he "cannot be regarded as impliedly consent-
ing that they be tried when not raised by the pleadings...", Too,
there was no ground for applying Rule 9W which pertains to
defective pleadings, not to a variance between pleading and proof.
The rule applied by the Court, that waiver of pleadings is
avoided by a specific objection prior to submission of the issue to
the jury, is consistent with prior opinions. However, one might at
least question whether the objection in this case was in fact suf-
ficient to apprise the trial court and opposing counsel of the defect
in question. Neither appellate opinion refers to the harmless error
rule. This is in accord with the rule prior to the new rules.' How-
ever, the requirement of pleading is now a rule,' as is the harmless
error rule,'" and it is submitted that the question of whether the
harmless error rule should be applied to this type of defect should
be re-examined.
SPECIAL ISSUES-RIGHT TO SUBMISSION AND ANSWER
Whether or not a party may insist that the jury make findings
2 208 S.W.(2d) 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
a 146 Tex. 504, 507, 208 S.W.(2d) 919, 921.
4TEx. RULES Civ. PRO. (1941)'Rule 274. In part: "A party objecting to a charge
must point out distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objec-
t i o n . . ."
sTEx. RULES Civ. Pno. (1941) Rule 67. In part: "When issues not raised by the
pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in
all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings."
6 146 Tex. 504, 509, 208 S.W.(2d) 919, 922.
STEax. RULES Crv. PRO. (1941) Rule 90.
8 Golden v. Odiorne, 112 Tex. 544, 249 S.W. 822 (1923).
9 TEx. RULES Civ. No. (1941) Rule 45.
20 Tx. RULES Cr. PRO. (1941) Rule 434.
1949]
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on an issue where a favorable answer thereon would conflict with
findings on adverse issues was considered in Blanton v. E. & L.
Transport Co.11 The Supreme Court, in reversing the Court of Civil
Appeals, reiterated its approval of the opinion by the Commission
of Appeals in Greer v. Thaman2 that
".... in order to accord each party a fair trial, our rules require that the
theories of each party be directly submitted where raised by the evi-
dence, and this right cannot be lost or defeated by jury findings on other
issues, which, in effect, indirectly negative a favorable finding on an
issue not submitted, but raised by the evidence." 13
The principle case, for injuries sustained in a collision, was
submitted on some 83 issues. The jury, in answer to two of the
issues, found, as to both defendants, that the accident was the
result of unavoidable accident; of the remaining issues, only
eight were answered and those were incomplete and wholly in-
decisive of the question of primary negligence. Deadlocked, the
jury was discharged after three days of deliberation. Plaintiff's
motion for mistrial was denied, and defendant's motion for judg-
ment on the findings of unavoidable accident was granted.
The Court of Civil Appeals" affirmed the trial court's action on
the theory that when an issue becomes "immaterial" under the
findings on other issues, then a judgment properly may be ren-
dered on the findings that are made; that the only benefit to be
gained should the jury return conflicting answers on other issues
would be that of setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial;
and, that the couit will presume the jury would have answered
consistently with its actual findings.
However, the Supreme Court, recognizing a litigant's benefit
under conflicting answers, distinguishes the case where answers to
requested issues would be immaterial and that where the answers
might result in conflict. The former is illustrated by the situation
11 146 Tex. 377, 207 S.W.(2d) 368 (1948).
12 55 S.W.(2d) 519 (Tex. Com. App. 1932).
13 Id. at 520.
"4 203 S.W.(2d) 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
[Vol. 3
1949] SURVEY OF TEXAS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1948 377
where, regardless of what the jury might have found on the
omitted issues, there could be no difference in the result of the
case. For instance, where the jury finds contributory negligence
as a contributing cause, the omission of the issue of primary negli-
gence becomes immaterial; for, whatever the findings might have
been on primary negligence, the plaintiff could not recover.1 5
Similarly, when both parties are acquitted of negligence by find-
ings on those issues, the issue of unavoidable accident becomes
immaterial. 6
In these cases, "the winning party was entitled to judgment no
matter what the jury may have said in response to the unanswered
issues."17
If the jury had answered the issue. of primary negligence
against the defendant, in the principle case, the jury would have
foreclosed the defendant's right to a judgment on the verdict; the
conflict would have required a new trial. If otherwise, the require-
ment of Rule 290,"8 that the verdict comprehend the whole or all
issues submitted to the jury, would not be met.
It was no answer, the Supreme Court held, to say that the court
will presume the jury would have answered consistently with its
actual findings, when, as in the principle case, it definitely appears
that the jury could make no findings whatever.
SPECIAL ISSUES--ASSUMPTION OF A DISPUTED FACT
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. McKay,1 9 one of
the issues submitted was: "Do you find . . . that any incapacity
... is due solely to disease that is not traceable to the injury sus-
tained ... ?"2 The defendant complained of this issue on grounds
that its unconditional reference to an injury improperly assumed
15 Ripley v. Dozier Construction Co., 45 S. W. (2d) 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
16 Brown v. Dallas Gas Co., 42 S.W.(2d) 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
IT Blanton v. E. & L. Transport Co., 146 Tex. 377, 379, 207 S.W.(2d) 368, 369 (1948).
18 Tx. RULFS CIV. PRO. (1941) Rule 290.
19 146 Tex. 569, 210 S.W.(2d) 147 (1948).
20 Id. at 571, 210 S.W.(2d) 147, 148.
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affirmative answers to those issues which inquired if plaintiff sus-
tained such injury. The Court of Civil Appeals" avoided discus-
sion of the contention by holding that the evidence, as a matter
of law, established accidental injury and made the error harmless.
The Supreme Court, recognizing the general rule that the prac-
tice of assuming affirmative answers to special issues was one to
be condemned, held the error to be harmless under Rule 434.22
It stated that the basis for the rule is a presumption-that jurors
will, because of the offending issue, infer "that the judge thinks
his own question a mere formality." And, in view of this, com-
mon sense was said to require the court to consider the offending
issue's probable effect on the minds of the jury in the light of the
charge as a whole.
Here the jury was admonished to answer on the evidence and
general instructions alone; full definitions were given on injury;
two issues were submitted as to whether or not plaintiff sustained
injury; and the words, "injury, if any," occurred fourteen times
in twelve issues preceding the offending issue.
"Under these circumstances, to say that... (the offending issue)
... might have misled the jury ... is to attribute to the jurors a men-
tality considerably different from that of the average man." '23
The question would seem to be one of degree; the case definitely
affirms that the harmless error rule is applicable to a defective
charge.
APPEAL AND ERROR-POWER OF CIVIL APPEALS TO
PASS ON EVIDENCE
Whether the Court of Civil Appeals can make original findings
of fact in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and the weight to
be given to the findings of the trial court were considered in
Wisdom v. Smith.24 In a trial without jury, the findings and con-
21205 S.W.(2d) 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
22Tx. RuLrs Cv. PNo. (1941) Rule 434.
23 146 Tex. 420, 209 S.W.(2d) 164 (1948).
24 146 Tex. 420, 209 S. W. (2d) 164 (1948).
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clusions established that petitioner was a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice.
The only assignment of error in the Court of Civil Appeals"
was that the evidence "conclusively established" that petitioner
was charged with notice. Notwithstanding, Civil Appeals assumed
that it had jurisdiction to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain the trial court and to make original findings of fact not
expressly found below. Consequently, it held that no express find-
ings were made on "constructive notice," and that the evidence
showed facts constituting such notice.
In reversing the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and
affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Supreme Court held
that no assignment of error having been made on grounds of
insufficiency of evidence to sustain the judgment, it was error for
the Court of Civil Appeals to pass upon that question;26 that the
only question before that court was whether there was any evi-
dence upon which the judgment could be based; 27 that the Court
of Civil Appeals had no power to determine originally questions
of fact in cases there on appeal;2" and, that where there are
omitted findings, the court must presume the evidence supports
them as well as those expressly found, provided there is some
evidence upon the omitted elements.29
As to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is confined to the
question-a question of law-whether there was any evidence to
sustain the judgment of the trial court. Concluding that there
25 Smith v. Smith, 205 S. W.(2d) 676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
26 DeWitt v. Brooks, 143 Tex. 122, 182 S. W. (2d) 687 (1944) ; See TEX. RULES Cry.
Pao. (1941) Rule 374.
27 In 3 TEX. Jua. § 771, 1102 (1929) it is stated to be a well settled rule that.., find-
ings of fact by the trial court will be upheld unless they are manifestly erroneous, and
tuat they will be overruled only where they are without any evidence to support them,
or ... so against the great weight or preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly
wrong." See Sweatt v. Painter, 210 S.W.(2d) 442 Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (citing the
principle case).
28 Accord, Wilson v. Wilson, 145 Tex. 607, 201 S.W.(2d) 226 (1947); Mooers v.
Richardson Petroleum Co., 146 Tex. 174, 204 S.W.(2d) 606 (1947).
29 T.x. RULES CIV. PRO. (1941) Rule 299; Moore v. Moore, 177 S.W.(2d) 998, (Tex-
Civ. App. 1944).
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was evidence to support the judgment, the Supreme Court upheld
the trial court's decision.
COUNTY COURTS-REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS THEREIN
The Supreme Court, in Clements v. Chaikowski,3° denied a
party's right to an equitable proceeding in the nature of a bill of
review where adequate relief could have been obtained by an
appeal.
The action was filed in the probate court; on August 26, 1946,
the court denied relief, and the term expired five days later. On
September 13, 1946, respondent filed a motion in the probate
court to vacate its order of August 26, date of the original hear-
ing. When relief was again denied, respondent appealed to the
district court." In the district court, respondent's appeal was
dismissed for having been filed too late.
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the dis-
missal of the district court, 2 holding that the time for appeal
began to run from October 15, when the motion to vacate was
denied; that the motion to vacate was in the nature of a bill of
review; and that respondent had 15 days from that date in which
to appeal.
However, the Supreme Court determined that the original
orders of the probate court were signed and entered nunc pro tunc
on September 12, and that respondent's time for appeal began
to run from that date.33 Instead of then taking an appeal to the
district court, respondent filed an equitable action while he still
had time for an appeal. Stating that the relief on appeal would be
as adequate and effective as a bill of review, since the appeal to
30 146 Tex. 408, 208 S.W.(2d) 841 (1948).
31 As to appeal from the county court to district court, see TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
(Vernon's, 1925) art. 3698 and art. 4313; TEx. RULES CIv. Pao. (1941) Rules 332-343.
32 203 S.W.(2d) 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
33 "When a judgment or order is entered nunc pro tunc, the right of appeal shall
date from the date of rendition of the nunc pro tunc judgment or order, which shall be
deemed to be the date upon which the trial judge signed the nunc pro tunc order ...
Tmz. RULES CIV. PRo. (1946) Rule 306b.
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the district court would be a trial de novo, the court held that an
equitable action in the nature of a bill of review, seeking to vacate
orders of a probate court, cannot be used as a substitute for an
appeal. Respondent having- failed to utilize the legal remedy
provided, equitable relief should be denied to him."
JURY MISCONDUCT-AGREEMENTS AMONG JURORS
In Kindy v. Willingham"t the Supreme Court had occasion to
distinguish between agreements among jurors which are proper
and those which constitute misconduct. The principle case presents
an example of the latter.
After retiring, and prior to any test vote or commitment by the
jurors, it was agreed that the entire panel would abide by the
verdict of. 75% of the members upon a vote thereafter taken. On
taking the vote, some issues were answered unanimously; others
were answered 8 to 4, one of the latter being vital to the determi-
nation of the cause.
In remanding for a new trial, the court held that agreements of
jurors to bind themselves, in advance, to abide by the decision
of the majority before a vote is taken is improper.
"The vice ... is that the jurors would not know the kind of verdict
to which they were bound, and would result in some of the jurors
adopting the views of others without surrendering their own.""
This is distinguished from the situation arising where, after a
definite vote is taken, the minority, not by reason of previous
agreements, but in abandonment of prior convictions, agreed to
adopt the majority's views. Under these circumstances, the agree-
ment is not condemned.
Eldon R. Vaughan.
34 For bill of review, see TEx. REY. Cry. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's, 1925) art. 4328;
also, Jones v. Sun Oil Co., 137 Tex. 353, 153 S.W.(2d) 571 (1941) ; As to certiorari to
county court, see Tex. REv. Crv. STAT. (Vernon's, 1925) art. 4329; TEZ. Ruxzs Crv. PRo.
(1941) Rules 344-350.
35 146 Tex. 548, 208 S.W.(2d) 585 (1948).
36 Id. at 551, 209 S. W. (2d) 585, 587.
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MISCONDUCT OF JURY-HARMLESS ERROR RULE APPLICABLE
In Watson v. Texas Indemnity Insurance Company, a court of
Civil Appeals' had held that the lack of sufficient evidence on
good cause for tardy filing of a workmen's compensation claim
should have prevented submission of such issue to the jury; and
accordingly, the defendant should have received an instructed
verdict. The Supreme Court,2 however, held there was sufficient
evidence on that issue to support the jury verdict, and reversed
and rendered for the plaintiff, affirming the trial court's judg-
ment. The defendant attempted to secure a new trial rather than
have judgment rendered against him by showing jury misconduct.
On voir dior it developed one juror had received a personal in-
jury. While the trial was in process, during a recess, he stopped
at the plaintiff's table to secure a "little free advice" as to his
chances of recovering for his injury. The juror stated to plain-
tiff's counsel that his employer had insurance. The counsel told
him he would have to see the policy. The juror stated he received
$75 for the injury, and signed a release. Both agreed the claim
was probably "dead". At the conclusion of the recess, the defend-
ant moved for a mistrial because of the incident, and again urged
the point in its motion for new trial. Both motions were overruled.
The Supreme Court applied Rule 327, and found no reversible
error.
Jury misconduct is governed by the special Rule 327, which
provides:
"Where the ground of the motion is misconduct of the jury or of the
officer in charge of them, or because of any communication made to
the jury or that they received other testimony, the court shall hear
evidence thereof from the jury or others in open court, and may grant
a new trial if such misconduct proved, or the testimony received, or
the communication made, be material, and if it reasonably appears
1207 S. W. (2d) 99, (Tex. Civ. App., 1947).
I _ _ Tex. ___ 210 S. W. (2d) 989 (1948).
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from the evidence both on the trial of the case and from the record as
a whole that injury probably resulted to the complaining party."3
The rule, in the main, carries on old Article 2234,4 except that the
complaining party now has the burden of showing probability of
injury. Before the adoption of the Rules of Civil Porcedure, Ar-
ticle 2234 was construed as compelling reversal if there was any
reasonable doubt as to whether the misconduct affected the deci-
sion of the jury.5 Cases such as Texas Milk Products Company v.
Birtcher,6 which were tried before the adoption of the new Rules,
but which reached the appellate courts after their adoption, ap-
plied the old Rule and placed on the party seeking to uphold the
jury's verdict the heavy burden of removing from the court's mind
all reasonable doubt that the misconduct prejudiced the complain-
ing party.
Barrington v. Duncan7 marks the first departure from the rea-
sonable doubt rule; holding, in fact, that Rule 327 abolishes it,
and substitutes in its stead
".... a rule which imposes upon the party asserting misconduct the
burden not only of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
such misconduct occurred, but also of showing that such misconduct
probably resulted in injury to him." 8
The case further holds the determination of whether misconduct
occurred to be question of fact, determinable by the fact finder,
unless undisputed evidence either way changes it to a law ques-
tion. Further, once misconduct is established, the reviewing court,
in the light of the entire record, must determine whether probable
injury resulted, i.e., it becomes a question of law in each court.'
3Tgx. RULES CIV. PRO. (1941).
4 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925), art. 2234.
5Casstevers v. Texas and Pac. Ry. Co., 119 Tex. 456, 32 S. W. (2d) 637 (1930).
6138 Tex. 178, 157 S. W. (2d) 633 (1941).
7140 Tex. 510, 169 S. W. (2d) 462 (1943). The court held discussion of insurance
resulted in probable injury, necessitating reversal.
8140 Tex. 510, 515, 169 S. W. (2d) 462, 464.
PCity of Houston v. Quinones, 142 Tex. 282, 177 S. W. (2d) 259 (1944).
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The principal case, in spite of the strong facts indicating injury,
would seem to have correctly applied the present rules. It is hard
for one to require an innocent counsel, accosted by an amiable
juror, to assume the unwanted duty of delivering a lecture to the
layman on the stringency of the law of jury misconduct. The
present rules accept this and approach the problem realistically.
However, the views of Judge Alexander in the Birtcher case, and
the cases prior to the new rules have merit. They feel the whole
"spirit of the law" prohibits even the most innocent contact be-
tween litigants or their counsels and jurors; that even the juror
who states he was not influenced, may unknowingly favor the
party accommodating him. The trial judge is perhaps best able
to balance the two considerations, and as the principal case notes,
his conclusion "will be respected."
VENUE-SUIT INVOLVING TITLE TO LAND
In Gates v. Coquat1" the plaintiff sued the defendant to enforce
a written promise to convey part of a ranch to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff brought his suit in the county in which the ranch was
located seeking to maintain venue in that county under exception
14 of Article 1995.11 In affirming the order of the lower court
sustaining a plea of privilege changing the venue to the defend-
ant's home county, the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals held
that the suit was not one for the "recovery of lands" as embraced
by the statute.
Exception 14 provides:
"Suits for the recovery of lands or damages thereto, or to remove
incumbrances upon the title to land, or to quiet the title to land, or
to prevent or stay waste on lands, must be brought in the county in
which the land, or a part thereof, may be."
It was early held in Texas that a suit for specific performance of
a contract for the sale of land was not a suit for the recovery of
10210 S. W. (2d) 614, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
11Tx. Rxv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1995.
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land.1" Nor does the term "suit for recovery of lands" embrace
such actions as that to foreclose a vendor's lien," to recover dam.
ages for an alleged breach of an agreement to purchase a lease
on land," or to enforce an oral agreement for a joint interest in
a mineral lease.15
Difficulties are many times presented in distinguishing between
suits for specific performance and suits to recover lands. In
Mecom v. Gallagher6 the court found a suit to recover lands in a
petition seeking to assert a preferential right, if the lessor ac-
quired the desire to sell, to purchase property under a recorded
lease. Likewise in Robinson v. O'Keefe 7 where the plaintiff was
suing to establish his interest in a mineral lease, basing his right
,on an alleged contract, the court found a suit for recovery of
lands. Both cases seem to base their distinctions on reasoning in
Hearst's Heirs v. Kuykendall's Heirs,"8 the early case cited pre-
viously. It was there stated, inter alia, that a suit for specific per-
formance had as its object the enforcement of the contract for its
sale-the delivery of a deed or title to the land-not the recovery
of the land itself.19 Recovery of lands, on the other hand, meant
ejectment, trespass to try title, or a suit to recover the land itself.
"To secure title deeds to land is one thing; to recover the land
itself is another... "20 The Robinson case quoted the early case
extensively, and felt it needed no elaboration or stated application
to the facts. The Mecom case, while not citing the Hearst's Heirs
case, did cite the Robinson case, and went to great length to show
the plaintiff was "entitled prima facie, to recover the lands sued
1 2Hearst's Heirs v. Kuykendall's Heirs, 16 Tex, 327 (1856).
13 Sumner v. Jester, 252 S. W. 1088 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
14Lockett v. Shaw, 106 S. W. (2d) 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
"'Lanier v. Looney, 2 S. W. (2d) 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) writ of error refused.
See 43 Tsx. JUR. 745 (1936) for cases under the exception.
16192 S. W. (2d) 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
17107 S. W. (2d) 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
1816 Tex. 327 (1856).
1s16 Tex. 327, 329.
2Olbid.
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for without the necessity for any deed of conveyance to him."'
Subsequent cases have regarded the distinction as well settled."
The court in the principal case states its rule as follows:
A suit based upon an equitable right, such as a suit for reformation
of a written instrument, or for specific performance of a contract, is
not a suit for the recovery of land within the provision of exception
14.23
Under Texas decisions, to say that a suit for specific performance
of a contract is not a suit for recovery of lands, is not at all to
say a suit to enforce an equitable right will never be one to re-
cover lands. If the court by its rule is stating such a proposition,
it is out of line with many cases enforcing equitable rights. The
Mecom case allowed the recovery of an equitable interest in land
to be within the exception, sustaining venue in the county where
the land was situated.2
There is also Carstairs v. Bomar,2" a Commission of Appeals
Case, whose opinion was adopted by the Supreme Court, which
enforced the clearest form of equitable right,26 and held the suit
to be one for the recovery of land within the exception.
VENUE-SUIT FOR FRAUD BROUGHT IN COUNTY WHERE
IT WAS COMMITTED
1948 presented the interesting case of Waller Peanut Company
v. Lee County Peanut Company.7 The defendants had purchased
several truck loads of peanuts from the plaintiffs. Each time
21192 S. W. (2d) 804, 806.22Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Monroe, 129 S. W. (2d) 454 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939) ; Budde v. Navarro Oil Co. 125 S. W. (2d) 1055 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) ; Superior
Oil Co. v. Dabney, 204 S. W. (2d) 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), reversed on other
grounds 211 S. W. (2d) 563.
2s210 S. W. (2d) 614.
24192 S. W. (2d) 804, 806. The court called the right "an absoluate, vested equitable
interest ... prior in right and superior in equity to any ... acquired or held by ap-
pellees."
2529 S. W. (2d) 334 (1930).
26A constructive trust in property devised to others in violation of a promise to
leave the property to the plaintiff.
27209 S. W. (2d) 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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plaintiffs would bill the defendants for the nuts at the agreed
price, and defendants would send their check to the plaintiffs in
payment. This procedure was followed for the last truck load of
nuts, but the defendants stopped payment on their check. It was
shown by the plaintiffs that the defendants had no intention of
paying for the nuts when they ordered them; that the defendants
felt the plaintiffs had shipped them worthless peanuts on a prior
load, but did not want to sue the plaintiffs in Lee County (plain.
tiff's residence) for breach of warranty. Instead after consulta-
tion with their lawyer, they devised this ruse to force the plain-
tiff's to come to Waller County (defendant's residence) and sue
for the price of the last load of nuts, intending to counterclaim
for breach of warranty. The action pleaded by the plaintiff was
for fraud, and suit was instituted in Lee County. The defendants
interposed a plea of privilege to be sued in Waller County, and
appealed from the lower court's order overruling the plea. The
Austin Court of Civil Appeals held the action was one for fraud,
committed in Lee County and thus came under exception 7 of
Article 1995.28
The pertinent part of exception 7 is as follows: "In all cases
of fraud.., suit may be brought in the county in which the fraud
was committed .. ." It is considered fraud if one makes a coft-
tractual promise with the undisclosed intention of not performing
it.29 Thus a false representation of the existence of an intent to pay
for goods, which induces the seller to advance credit, is fraud.80
Even if there be no express false statement, as the principal case
notes, the mere application for credit necessarily implies an inten-
tion to pay, and a contrary intention constitutes actionable fraud.31
The principal case is the first Texas case found applying these
28TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1995.
292 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 473, 900 (1932).
30 Boerner v. Cicero-Smith Lumber Co., 298 S. W. 545 (Tex. Com. App. 1927);
Slayden-Kirkey Woolen Mills v. Weber, 46 Civ. App. 433, 102 S. W. 471 (1907); 37
TEzx. JuR. 633 (1935).
8 1Boerner v. Cicero-Smith Lumber Co. 298 S. W. 545 (Tex. Com. App. 1927).
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rules of fraud to exception 7 of the venue statute, and holding the
petition to be one based on fraud.
There was injected into the principal case an issue which has
caused much confusion throughout the law, viz: is the cause of
action alleged in tort or contract? Mere breach of contract is not
fraud,32 and the exception does not include suits for breach of
contract. 38 Nor can "mere reiterations of fraud alter the real
nature of the suit as shown by the facts alleged."34 Thus in Bunger
v. Campbell the court said:
"The rule is well settled that even though a contract may have been
induced by fraud, where the innocent party elects to sue on the con-
tract, rather than for his damages for the fraud, he cannot rely on
the fraud to fix the venue of his suit. ' '35
An alternative prayer for recovery in breach of contract does not
affect the venue where the cause of action is basically ex delicto."6
The courts simply weigh all the facts, as in the principal case,"
to find which was the incidental and which was the basic theory
of recovery. Upon finding it to be fraud, they allow the suit to
be maintained in the county in which it was committed.
It should be noted that constructive fraud 8 is included within
the exception. 9 Stephens County v. Burt and Company" indicates
the difficulty in distinguishing a case of constructive fraud from
a quasi-contractual recovery. As the dissenter, Justice Funder-
burk, notes if the cause of action on tort is once voluntarily waived
t2 Idar v. Alaniz, 70 S. W. (2d) 756 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
sSLyon v. Gray, 265 S. W. 1094 (1924).
s Oakes and Witt v. Thompson, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 364, 125 S. W. 320, 321 (1910).
s5183 S. W. (2d) 1001, 1002 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
'
5 Austin Bros. v. First Baptist Church, 77 S. W. (2d) 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
37209 S. W. (2d) 405, 407.
as"Constructive fraud is a breach of duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the
law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive, to violate confidence, or to
injure public interests." 37 C. J. S. 211 (1943).
SPBooth v. Feist, 80 Tex. 141, 15 S. W. 799 (1891) ; Stevens County v. Burt and Co.
19 S. W. (2d) 951 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) writ of error dismissed; noted in 8 TEX. L.
REv. 446 (1930) ; 20 TEx. JUR. 125 (1932).
4019 S. W. (2d) 951 (Tex. Civ. App., 1929) writ of error dismissed.
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then the legal fiction-the implied promise-is the cause of
action. Any acts of fraud then relied on do not constitute the cause
of action, but simply are evidence "to show the existence of the
duty to refund." This subtle distinction, no matter what merit it
may have in logic, does not seem to have been accepted by the
recent cases. The liberal tendency to find actionable fraud in an
ambiguous petition is followed with little discussion.4
VENUE-NECESSITY OF ACTIVE NEGLIGENCE UNDER
EXCEPTION 9
Two 1948 cases take their place alongside the countless other
Texas cases seeking to distinguish that negligence which is active,
and thus a trespass under exception 9 of the venue statute, from
that negligence which is passive and not under the exception. In
Hoover v. Horton42 plaintiff and defendant owned adjoining
farms. Plaintiff sued for damages to his crops, fence rows and
lands occasioned when topsoil from defendant's land was blown
onto that of the plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that a duty rested on
defendant to use such farming methods as would prevent blowing
of his topsoil onto plaintiff's land; that, notwithstanding this duty,
defendant "failed and refused" to farm his land properly. Spe-
cific acts of negligence alleged were use of a one-way plow, fail-
ure to plow deep enough, failing to plow to the top clods of sub-
soil which would not blow, and waiting until late December to
plant his wheat crop. Plaintiff brought suit in D County where
the land was located seeking to maintain venue there under excep-
tions 9 and 14." Defendant filed his plea of privilege to be sued
in the county of his residence. The plea was sustained. In affirming
the action of the lower court, the Court of Civil Appeals found
41Note, 8 Tzx. L. REv. 446 (1930); Oakley v. Hargrove, 125 S. W. (2d) 403 (1939):
see also the principal case, 209 S. W. (2d) at 407, where the fact that the alleged
market value of the peanuts and the contract value were the same was considered im-
material.
42209 S. W. (2d) 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
43This exception is not within the scope of this article. See 2 SOUTHWESTERN L. J.
437 (1948).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
only an omission to perform a duty, thus not a trespass within
exception 9.
In Bussey v. Mack"' defendant was servicing a butane gas tank
by gravity flow. In violation of a Railroad Commission order re-
quiring two hoses in such situations--one to equalize pressure,
the other to transfer the liquid-defendant was using only one
hose. The outlet leading from the tank to plaintiff's house had
been shut off by the defendant, and there was no way pressure
could escape. Liquefied gas was being forced into the open air,
and was clearly discernible as it vaporized into a white fog. This
gas caught fire, and a strong wind blew the flames towards the
house. Plaintiffs sue in C County, where the accident occurred,
for loss of personalty. They seek to establish venue there under
exception 9. The Court of Civil Appeals held defendant's use
of improper or insufficient equipment constituted affirmative negli-
gence, and thus was a trespass under the exception.
Exception 9 of Article 1995" provides:
"A suit based upon a crime, offense, or trespass may be brought in the
county where such crime, offense, or trespass was committed. .
Reference should be made to the 1947 survey issue of this journal
for additional comments on this exception.'6
Lawyers who remember the famous old case of Hill v. Kim-
ball" for its pioneering efforts in the law of mental anguish may
be surprised to learn Judge Gaines had only to decide an impor-
tant point of venue. He there held that the word trespass in what
is our present exception 9 embraced wrongs arising from negli-
gence as well as intentional wrongs. It was only a year later in
1891 that the same judge had to qualify his decision, and in the
oft-cited case of Ricker v. Shoemaker"5 drew the nebulous dis-
"4209 S. W. (2d) 385 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
45TEx. REv. CIr. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1995.
462 SouTHwsTERN L. J. 443 (1948).
4t76 Tex. 210, 13 S. W. 59 (1890); cl: Hubbard v. Lord, 59 Tex. 384 (1883).
4881 Tex. 22, 16 S. W. 645 (1891).
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tinction which Texas law still retains. The case held that trespass
in the statute includes only the actions based on wrongful acts
"willfully or negligently committed, and not those which result
from a mere omission to do a duty."49 To say the least, the subse-
quent cases defining the limits between active and passive negli-
gence have been unsatisfactory.
Perhaps the most lucid explanation to be found is that in
Metzger's Dairies v. Wharton. In holding that a suit alleging
defendant was negligent in bottling milk with glass in it was not
a suit based on a trespass the court stated:
"Negligence always, if it exists, involves a failure of duty. Negligence
consists of acts or omission. If the duty is breached by 'an act' the
negligence is that of affirmative character which may be a trespass.
If the duty is breached by the failure or omission to do something which
it was the person's duty to do, the negligence is negative and does not
constitute a trespass." 51
Yet this very case, approved by the Supreme Court, 52 and so well
considered did not refer to the earlier case of Universal Mills v.
Kennedy" which would appear to be directly in point on the facts.
It was there held a suit for "negligently permitting" pieces of
metal to be in dairy rations sold to plaintiff was a trespass.
When confronted with a doubtful case a consideration of the
rule and the statute in their setting might be useful. The word tres-
pass came into the statute in 1863," when bringing a suit, par-
ticularly when the defendant's residence in a distant county ne-
cessitated a long trip, was a tiresome and time-consuming opera-
tion. As Judge Gaines noted in Hill v. Kimball, the inducement
49Id. at 26, 16 S. W. 645, 646.
501 13 S. W. (2d) 675 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Accord, Whitson Food Products Co.
v. McClung, 206 S. W. (2d) 659 (1947).
51113 S. W. (2d) 675, 677.
52Barron v. James, 145 Tex. 283, 198 S. W. (2d) 256 (1946) ; Jackson v. McClendon,
143 Tex. 577, 187 S. W. (2d) 374 (1945).
5"27 S. W. (2d) 318 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) ; See also Panther Oil and Grease Mfg. Co.
v. Shumaker, 166 S. W. (2d) 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
545 GAmmEL's LAWS 664, amending 2 GAxxm's LAws 1670.
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in granting the exception to the general rule which was designed
to place the inconvenience on the suing party"6
".... was that one who has been injured in his person or property by the
wrongful or negligent conduct of another, should not be driven to a
distant forum to get redress of his wrongs.""
Thus the legislature coupled a trespass with a crime or an offence
and said the defendant in such cases was to bear the inconven-
ience. One wonders, then, in doubtful cases if the true distinction
can really be said to be between a passive or an active act. Might
not a more useful classification be between a reckless, culpable
act which approaches a crime or an offense on the one hand, and
one which does not so greatly deviate from the accepted norm of
conduct as to merit placing on the defendant the inconvenience?
The two principal cases are illustrative. In the Hoover case the
court carefully examined the evidence and concluded that the
use of a one-way plow was not inherently wrong, "that there is a
difference of opinion among farmers as to" its proper use."
Further the court was quick to note that unusually high winds
partially caused the erosion. The court in the Bussey case also
examined the evidence carefully and found circumstances of reck-
less conduct."5
The rules applicable to failure to keep a proper lookout are
openly based on the culpable nature of the defendant's acts, rather
than a strict application of the active-passive distinction. It has
been held that failure to keep a proper lookout is active negli-
gence,59 but a very recent case requires evidence of recklessness
or an unlawful rate of speed before the negligence is considered
55Meredith v. McClendon, 130 Tex. 527, 111 S. W. (2d) 1062 (1938).
6676 Tex. 210, 217, 13 S. W. 59, 60.
17209 S. W. (2d) 646, 649.
5s209 S. W. (2d) 385, 386.
59Evans v. Jeffrey, 181 S. W. (2d) 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) ; J. A. & E. D. Trans.
port Co. v. Rusin, 202 S. W. (2d) 693 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) ; Contra, Bettis v. Rayburn,
143 S. W. (2d) 1011 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
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active.60 The case was following Barron v. James"' where nu-
merous alleged acts of omission (among them failure to keep a
proper lookout) were held to constitute passive negligence, but
the court carefully pointed out: "There is no evidence that the
bus was being driven recklessly or at an unlawful rate of speed
or in violation of any law."62 See the note for further illustra-
tions.6 3
The Barron case makes it clear that whatever may be the under-
lying distinction in doubtful cases, where the facts clearly show
nonfeasance the Ricker case, and its terminology, remain Texas
law. For example, leaving an unlighted car on a well traveled
highway is always considered passive negligence under the ex-
ception if Article 799 of the Penal Code is inapplicable. 4 One
case even held this to be passive even though the defendant's
agent parked his unlighted truck completely across the street.6 5
Dean Gandy.
6OEubanks v. Hopkins, 203 S. W. (2d) 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
61145 Tex. 283, 198 S. W. (2d) 256 (1946).
621d at 291, 198 S. W. (2d) 2.56, 261.
63Jackson v. McClendon, 14.3 Tex. 577, 187 S. W. (2d) 374 (1945) (failure to
have machinery present to remove cement from plaintiff's valuable well before it
hardened held active negligence) ; Brooks v. Hornbeck, 274 S. W. 162 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925) (Plaintiff's broken leg set improperly) ; cf. Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 188
S. W. (2d) 770 (1945) ; English v. Miller, 33 S. W. (2d) 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930)
(acrobatic airplane flying at low altitude held active negligence-the court defines
such negligence as "the doing of something that should not have been done") ; Com-
pare such cases as Sherrod v. Bird, 155 S. W. (2d) 422 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) and
Murray v. Jones, 56 S. W. (2d) 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932): there an act intervened
between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury; Note also the cases
holding that the trespass must he committed by the defendant and not by his agent
which it is submitted would not be material under a strict active-passive rule, but
would only have weight if the word trespass had a criminal tinge, e. g. Wettermark v. Cam-
eron, 93 Tex. 517, 56 S. W. 331 (1900) ; Murray v. Jones, 56 S. W. (2d) 276 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932).
S4Martin v. Reid, 200 S. W. (2d) 890 (Tex. Civ. App., 1947) ; See note, 12 Tax. L
Rtv. 248 (1934).
6sSchoenmann v. Otey, 126 S. W. (2d) 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).

